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“Whistle Blowers”: To What Extent Does Federal 
Law Impose Mandatory Reporting Obligations 
on Collegiate Coaches for Allegations of Sexual 
Misconduct? 
Julia Tabat† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sexual violence perpetrated by student athletes or within univer-
sity athletic programs is a recurring theme in the media. Some statis-
tics even suggest that athletes account for a disproportionate amount 
of sexual assault on college campuses.1 Recent scandals involving the 
Ohio State, Baylor, Penn State, and Colorado athletic departments (to 
name a few) illustrate varying fact patterns with the same central con-
cern: a coach who knew about ongoing sexual violence, yet failed to act 
to stop it.2 These stories raise questions about the extent to which col-
legiate coaches are mandatory reporters under federal law, including 
when they impose legal liability on their schools for failing to comply 
with their obligations. In the era of #MeToo, clarifying the scope of a 
coach’s duty to report is critical, both to protect collegiate campuses and 
 
 †  B.S. 2017, The University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D. Candidate 2020, The University of 
Chicago Law School. I would like to thank Professor Anthony Casey for his advice, guidance, and 
feedback. Additionally, I would like to thank the past and present staff and board of The University 
of Chicago Legal Forum. 
 1 See Jeremy D. Heacox, Clery Act Responsibilities for Reporting Allegations of Peer-on-Peer 
Sexual Assaults Committed by Student-Athletes, 10 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 48, 50 (2012) (refer-
encing Jenni E. Spies, Winning at All Costs: An Analysis of a University’s Potential Liability for 
Sexual Assaults Committed by Its Student Athletes, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 429, 430 (2006)). 
 2 See Michael McCann, Legal Angles of Ohio State’s Probe into Urban Meyer’s Knowledge of 
Charges Against Zach Smith, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.si.com/college-foot-
ball/2018/08/01/urban-meyer-zach-smith-ohio-state-legal-contract-firing-paid-leave [https://perm 
a.cdd/Z2VJ-KPW7] (discussing the potential liability Ohio State football coach Urban Meyer faced 
after failing to report a domestic violence allegation). See generally Andrew Solomon, Preventing 
Recurrences of the Cover-Ups at Penn State & Baylor (and Now Michigan State): Where Does It 
End?, 28 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 379 (2018) (detailing the reporting failures of coaches, athletic 
directors, and university presidents at Penn State and Baylor after learning of ongoing instances 
of child abuse and sexual assault, respectively). 
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to ensure that the coach does not overstep a victim’s right to privacy or 
an accused’s right to due process. 
However, federal laws governing mandatory reporting are scarce 
and occasionally conflicting, leaving reporting duties unclear. Further-
more, ex post determinations of wrongdoing by a court or federal agency 
do not provide coaches with clear guidelines regarding their ex ante le-
gal reporting responsibilities. Faced with ambiguity, many universities 
insert catch-all “sexual misconduct” clauses into their employment con-
tracts, fearing federal liability otherwise.3 While well-meaning, these 
clauses are often overly broad and ill-defined, leaving a coach wonder-
ing whether even a third-party’s whisper of a player’s sexual activity 
requires a report.4 Coaches are left in a difficult position—over-report-
ing might overstep a victim’s right to privacy and distance the coach 
from his/her players (thus, deterring future reporting).5 On the other 
hand, under-reporting can exacerbate the harm to current or potential 
victims, deter survivors from coming forward, and lead to liability for 
the university under federal or state law.6 Recent federal regulations 
proposed by the Department of Education (DOE) purport to address 
some of the general issues with reporting sexual misconduct, but they 
do not speak specifically to coaches’ role in the process.7 
This Comment focuses on the scope of mandatory reporting obliga-
tions that coaches8 incur under federal law, specifically Title IX9 and 
the Clery Act.10 It examines whether and how coaches’ reporting obli-
gations change depending on: (1) the type of action brought (adminis-
trative enforcement actions v. private lawsuits); (2) the substance of the 
allegation, including the definition of sexual misconduct that coaches 
must report; (3) the level of authority the coach possesses; and (4) the 
source of the allegation and the identity of the parties involved. The 
 
 3 See Scott Bernstein & Justin Dillon, Coach Contract Sexual Misconduct Clauses Are Con-
cerning, LAW 360 (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www-law360-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/articles/1072401/co 
ach-contract-sexual-misconduct-clauses-are-concerning [https://perma.cc/5CE9-97WV]. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See, e.g., Jill C. Engle, Where Do We Go from Here?: Mandatory Reporting of Campus Sexual 
Assault and Domestic Violence: Moving to a Victim-Centric Protocol That Comports with Federal 
Law, 24 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 401 (2015) (arguing that current reporting procedures do 
not respond adequately to victims’ choice on how to proceed and right to privacy). 
 6 Id. 
 7 See generally Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified 
at 34 C.F.R. 106). 
 8 This Comment uses “coaches” to mean full-time or part-time university employees who 
serve as a head or assistant coach on one or more of the school’s sanctioned athletic teams. It will 
exclude athletic directors from its consideration (because they are often considered separately un-
der Title IX). See, e.g., S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). 
 9 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1989). 
 10 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (2013). 
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Comment concludes by reconciling the substantive and procedural in-
consistencies in these four areas and proposing a solution for clearer 
reporting standards. 
Ultimately, this Comment argues that the proposed Title IX DOE 
regulations should mimic the Clery Act’s substantive definitions for sex-
ual misconduct, with a few exceptions regarding the scope of reporting 
obligations. The Comment also contends that the DOE’s informal regu-
lation scheme is the proper procedure for implementing and enforcing 
Title IX reporting requirements. This “hybrid” solution between Title 
IX and the Clery Act would provide a uniform substantive standard for 
reporting sexual misconduct under federal law, which would clarify 
coaches’ and universities’ obligations and maximize their incentives to 
comply with their duties. 
II. REPORTING OBLIGATIONS IN TITLE IX AND THE CLERY ACT 
Statutory federal law on mandatory reporting is scarce; one of the 
few examples is the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act 
(CAPTA).11 CAPTA sets forth the minimum definitions of child abuse 
and neglect for reporting purposes, but states are left to designate who 
counts as a reporter.12 Moreover, CAPTA only requires states to have 
reporting laws for children up to the age of eighteen.13 Thus, it generally 
does not apply to the students and university members with whom col-
legiate coaches tend to interact. 
Nevertheless, two pieces of federal legislation—Title IX and the 
Clery Act—impose reporting obligations on educational institutions, 
and, by extension, implicate coaches. Although the two acts serve dif-
ferent purposes, they both inform universities of their reporting duties 
for allegations of sexual violence.14 First, Congress enacted Title IX in 
1972 in an effort to prevent sex discrimination in education and athlet-
ics.15 Enforced by both administrative agencies and private plaintiffs, 
Title IX and its corresponding federal regulations provide schools with 
duties to prevent, report, and investigate sexual misconduct.16 
 
 11 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–06 (2016). 
 12 Id. at § 5106(g). 
 13 Id. at § 5106. 
 14 See Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads in the Sand: Lack of Knowledge, Knowledge 
Avoidance, and the Persistent Problem of Campus Peer Sexual Violence, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 205 
(2011). 
 15 See David Lanser, Title IX and How to Rectify Sexism Entrenched in NCAA Leadership, 31 
WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y 181, 184 (2016). 
 16 See A.J. Bolan, Deliberate Indifference: Why Universities Must Do More to Protect Students 
from Sexual Assault, 86 GEO. WASH L. REV. 804, 810 (2018). 
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In contrast, the Clery Act arose out of safety concerns after a college 
student was murdered in her dorm room on campus.17 Her parents ar-
gued that had her university published crime statistics revealing a pat-
tern of violence on campus, she would have chosen to attend a different 
school.18 As a result, the Act requires federally funded schools to “notify 
[their] constituent campus communities . . .when certain crimes are 
brought to their attention.”19 Among these crimes are murder, arson, 
and robbery, as well as sex-based crimes, such as sexual assault, do-
mestic violence, dating violence, and stalking.20 The Act’s purpose is to 
“aid in the prevention of similar occurrences” and to obligate “campus 
security authorities” (CSAs) to report crime.21 
Although Title IX and the Clery Act overlap, they take different 
approaches to reporting, leaving several ambiguities for collegiate 
coaches as to their responsibilities. These differences are examined in 
the following section. 
A. Title IX Reporting Obligations 
Title IX itself does not impose specific reporting requirements on 
any university employees, much less athletic staff. Instead, it provides 
that: 
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.22 
Formerly, the only federal regulations governing Title IX (and its 
corresponding obligations for universities) were promulgated in 1975 by 
the DOE’s predecessor, the Department of Health, Education, and Well-
ness. These regulations were replicated and adopted identically by the 
DOE after its creation.23 The 1975 regulations do not address a univer-
sity’s reporting duties with respect to sexual misconduct because they 
were created before the Supreme Court held that such harassment con-
stituted discrimination under Title IX.24 
 
 17 See Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(i)–(iii). 
 21 Id. 
 22 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1986). 
 23 See Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 24 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61463–65 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codi-
fied at 34 C.F.R. 106). 
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In 1982, however, the Supreme Court concluded that an institu-
tion’s failure to address sexual harassment can constitute discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex, thereby imposing reporting obligations on 
schools (and, by extension, their employees) for such conduct. 25 The 
George W. Bush Administration supported this assertion and provided 
universities with guidelines for defining and investigating sexual mis-
conduct under Title IX (“The 2001 Guidelines”).26 The Obama Admin-
istration went further, supplementing The 2001 Guidelines with a se-
ries of Dear Colleague Letters (DCLs)27 and Title IX “Questions and 
Answers”28 to clarify and expand the scope of such reporting obligations. 
Because both the 2001 Guidelines and the subsequent Obama-era guid-
ance documents were not implemented via either a formal or informal 
process for promulgating federal executive regulations, they were often 
considered mere “suggestions” for universities.29 This also meant that 
none of these documents were entitled to the “highest deference” that 
courts typically allow to executive agencies under the doctrine set forth 
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.30 
However, in 2018 the DOE withdrew all previous executive docu-
ments31 and, in their place, issued a set of proposed regulations to gov-
ern Title IX compliance.32 These regulations did follow informal regu-
lation procedures and will take effect after the DOE reviews and 
considers the public comments submitted to them regarding the new 
regime.33 Until that time, reporting obligations under Title IX remain 
in flux, and are examined in the next section. 
 
 25 See generally Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (classifying teacher-on-stu-
dent sexual harassment as actionable under Title IX); Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 
629 (1999) (extending Franklin to cases of peer-on-peer harassment). 
 26 See Office for Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students 
by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 66 Fed. Reg. 5512 (Jan. 19, 2001), https:// 
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/JX5H-4XR3] [hereinafter 20-  
01 Sexual Harassment Guidance]. 
 27 See generally Office for Civil Rights, 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., 1–
19 (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://pe 
rma.cc/7VNJ-GFRD]. 
 28 See generally Office for Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, 
U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., 1–53 (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-2014 
04-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF9W-R7MX]. 
 29 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61463. 
 30 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (holding that courts may give “considerable weight” to an admin-
istrative agency’s construction or interpretation of statutes they enforce). 
 31 See generally Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., 1–3 (Sept. 
22, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf [https://p 
erma.cc/6UL4-8PAL] [hereinafter 2017 Dear Colleague Letter]. 
 32 See generally Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462. 
 33 See Tovia Smith, Trump Administration Gets an Earful on New Campus Sexual Assault 
Rules, N.P.R. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/30/689879689/education-department-g 
athers-feedback-on-new-campus-sexual-assault-rules [https://perma.cc/5HWS-F568]. 
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1. Public v. private enforcement actions 
Viewed as a contract between the federal government and the re-
cipient school,34 Title IX permits regulatory agencies to conduct inves-
tigations and withdraw funding from institutions who are guilty of sex 
discrimination.35 Accordingly, most of the guidance regarding the scope 
of Title IX comes from federal regulations and guidelines. However, the 
Supreme Court established in 1979 that private plaintiffs do have an 
implied right-of-action under Title IX.36 In so doing, the Court explained 
that Congress intended for Title IX to prevent federal agencies from 
funding discriminatory practices, but also “to provide individual citi-
zens effective protection against those practices.”37 Therefore, private 
enforcement through an implied right-of-action is necessary to ensure 
compliance among recipients; after all, federal agencies only have lim-
ited funding for investigations.38 
In spite of this holding, courts strictly limit plaintiffs’ ability to re-
cover monetary damages under Title IX. For example, in Gebser v. Lago 
Visa Independent School District,39 the Supreme Court held that an in-
stitution could not be vicariously liable for the misconduct of its employ-
ees under Title IX.40 It explained that, because the statute requires ad-
ministrative agencies to advise a school of its noncompliance before 
initiating sanctions, private plaintiffs could not recover damages until 
they proved that a school had actual (not constructive) notice of the sex-
ual harassment.41 One year later, the Court enumerated a four-part test 
for Title IX liability, which requires the plaintiff to demonstrate: 
(1) the school had actual knowledge of sexual harassment; 
(2) the school was deliberately indifferent to such harassment; 
(3) the harassment was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively of-
fensive,” that it 
(4) deprived the victim of “access to the educational opportuni-
ties or benefits provided by the school.”42 
 
 34 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 289 (1998). 
 35 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1989). 
 36 Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). 
 37 Id. at 704. 
 38 See id. at 708 n.42. 
 39 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
 40 Id. at 285. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999). 
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Gebser was a 5–4 decision; in dissent, Justice Stevens urged the 
Court to consider the implications of imposing such a high threshold for 
plaintiffs to meet in order to bring a Title IX action.43 He also pointed 
out that, in Franklin (the decision where the Court initially held that 
sexual harassment could constitute discrimination) the Court permit-
ted the plaintiff to recover damages, despite the fact that the DOE had 
not withdrawn federal funding from the school for its failure to address 
the harassment.44 Franklin suggested that courts are free to follow a 
less stringent standard than federal agencies do to determine whether 
a school faces Title IX liability. Nevertheless, in the years since Gebser, 
courts have continued to impose a high barrier to private recovery un-
der Title IX.45 The Tenth Circuit even noted that “actual notice [under 
Gebser] requires more than a simple report of inappropriate conduct,”46 
suggesting that plaintiffs must satisfy additional requirements before 
they may recover damages. 
Administrative proceedings under Title IX, by contrast, generally 
involve a review of the school’s internal policies and procedures.47 They 
also require the reviewing federal agency to provide the school with no-
tice of its noncompliance and attempt to help it address any of its short-
comings before withdrawing funding.48 Previous executive guidance 
made it unclear exactly when a school failed to comply with the statute, 
so the DOE’s proposed regulations streamline federal investigations by 
imposing the same liability standard used in Davis and Gebser.49 Thus, 
under the new rules, in enforcement proceedings—as well as in private 
lawsuits—universities are not liable for student-on-student sexual har-
assment unless they have actual knowledge of severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive sexual misconduct and act with deliberate indiffer-
ence towards it.50 
Schools, rather than coaches, face direct liability for reporting fail-
ures under Title IX, both in private and public enforcement proceed-
ings. Nonetheless, the structure of the Act and its standard of liability 
have implications for the extent to which coaches are mandatory report-
ers. If the standard of institutional liability is too low or too high, 
 
 43 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 304 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 44 Id. at 303. 
 45 See, e.g., Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 2018) (requiring plaintiffs’ specific 
factual allegations of discrimination in a Title IX complaint). 
 46 Escue v. N. Okla. Coll., 450 F.3d 1146, 1153 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 47 See 28 C.F.R. § 42.107 (1973). 
 48 Id. 
 49 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61466–68 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codi-
fied at 34 C.F.R. 106). 
 50 Id. 
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schools may provide coaches with reporting obligations that are under 
or overinclusive of what federal law requires. 
2. Substance and definitions of reporting obligations (“what and 
where?”) 
Title IX does not define discrimination, so interpretations of what 
needs to be reported under the statute come from administrative guid-
ance and judicial decisions. For example, in Davis v. Monroe County 
Board. of Education,51 the Supreme Court recognized peer-on-peer sex-
ual harassment as actionable against an institution under Title IX.52 
However, courts struggle to provide an adequate definition of ac-
tionable sexual misconduct. The Davis Court looked to Title VII53 to de-
fine harassment, holding that the sexual misconduct must be so “severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive” as to deprive a student of equal 
educational benefits.54 It further explained that whether sexual miscon-
duct is actionable depends on “surrounding circumstances, expecta-
tions, and relationships . . . including, but not limited to, the ages of the 
harasser and the victim and the number of individuals involved.”55 Fi-
nally, Davis also acknowledged that “in theory, a single instance of suf-
ficiently severe one-on-one peer harassment” could suffice to satisfy the 
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive standard, but it ultimately 
concluded that it was “unlikely that Congress would have thought such 
behavior sufficient to rise to this level.”56 However, this case may be 
distinguishable from collegiate cases, since the Court was considering 
the conduct of fifth graders, who it expected would resort to frequent 
immature conduct.57 
The Bush Administration’s 2001 Guidelines embraced the Davis 
approach, refusing to provide a more specific definition of actionable 
sexual misconduct.58 Courts interpreted the standard narrowly; the 
Sixth Circuit held that a single incident of alleged non-consensual kiss-
ing is insufficient to demonstrate “severe, pervasive, and objectively of-
fensive” behavior depriving a victim of equal opportunities at school.59 
It also refused to find actionable misconduct when a male student—on 
 
 51 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 52 Id. at 650. 
 53 Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of sex. 
 54 Id. at 651 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)). 
 55 Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See generally Office for Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 26. 
 59 Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2018). 
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three separate occasions—shoved a female student into a locker, de-
manded that she perform oral sex on him, and made obscene gestures 
at her.60 In 2014, in response to mounting pressure to provide clearer 
criteria and definitions, the DOE’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) issued 
its “Title IX Questions and Answers.”61 These guidelines stressed the 
need for schools to report all allegations of sexual violence, defined as 
“physical sexual acts perpetrated against a person’s will or where a per-
son is incapable of giving consent . . . including rape, sexual assault, 
sexual battery, sexual abuse, and sexual coercion.”62 However, it left 
“harassment” intact under Davis, noting that schools had the responsi-
bility to provide more coherent definitions themselves.63 
Due to the confusion surrounding the substance and scope of re-
porting obligations under the former guidelines, the Trump Admin-
istration’s proposed regulations provide a specific definition of actiona-
ble sexual harassment.64 This definition encompasses three different 
types of conduct.65 First, it includes quid pro quo harassment: when a 
recipient’s employee conditions receipt of a benefit or service upon a 
student or coworker’s participation in unwelcome sexual conduct.66 Sec-
ond, it codifies the standard in Davis, and holds actionable sexual har-
assment that is “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it 
effectively denies a person equal access to a recipient’s education pro-
gram or activity.”67 Third, the new regulations incorporate the defini-
tion of sexual assault referred to in the Clery Act regulations (“an of-
fense that meets the definition of rape, fondling, incest, or statutory 
rape as used in the FBI’s UCR program”).68 However, the new rule does 
not include other sex-based Clery Act crimes, because the DOE believes 
that Title IX’s focus is not on “crimes per se,” but instead on behavior 
that deprives university members of equal opportunities based on their 
sex.69 
 
 60 See Pahssen v. Merrill Cmty. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 360, 363–64 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding 
no liability because the school instituted a “supervision plan” to prevent future incidents, although 
the victim argued that this plan led to more abuse off-campus). 
 61 See Office for Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, supra 
note 28, at *1. 
 62 See id. 
 63 Id. at *13. 
 64 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Fed-
eral Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61466–68 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified 
at 34 C.F.R. 106). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 61466. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. 668.46 (2015)). 
 69 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61467–68 proposed 
Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. 106). 
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Equally challenging to define are the geographical and functional 
limits to coaches’ reporting obligations under Title IX. Originally, some 
courts insisted that Title IX applied only to “operations of a college or 
university that are educational in nature,” thus excluding operations 
such as university dining services.70 However, most courts now agree 
that Title IX should be read broadly in conjunction with the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act amendments.71 Passed in 1987, these amendments 
sought to clarify Title IX’s text—specifically, what it means for sex-
based discrimination to occur within an “education program or activ-
ity.”72 They explain that Title IX applies to any university-sponsored 
program, including “traditional educational operations, faculty and stu-
dent housing, campus shuttle bus service, campus restaurants, the 
bookstore, and other commercial activities.”73 However, in 2014, the 
Obama Administration changed the analysis by requiring that a school 
“process all complaints of sexual violence, regardless of where the con-
duct occurred.”74 For example, reportable misconduct included inci-
dents occurring in fraternities, on field trips (“including athletic team 
travel”), and during off-campus events for school clubs.75 
To harmonize the conflicting approaches to Title IX’s geographical 
scope, the proposed regulations clarify what it means for a university 
activity or program to be within the scope of Title IX.76 Schools are re-
sponsible for all misconduct occurring within their “operations,” includ-
ing activities encompassing “any academic, extracurricular, research, 
[or] occupational training.”77 There are no geographical constraints on 
these operations, but when determining whether an activity falls within 
the school’s sphere of liability, the DOE will use factors developed by 
courts in their Title IX jurisprudence.78 These factors include: whether 
the conduct occurred at a location owned by the recipient; whether the 
recipient exercised oversight, supervision, or discipline over the context 
in which the misconduct occurred; and whether the recipient funded, 
sponsored, promoted, or endorsed the event in question.79 Thus, coaches 
 
 70 Preyer v. Dartmouth, 968 F. Supp. 20, 25 (D.N.H. 1997) (emphasis added). 
 71 Fox v. Pittsburg St. Univ., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1124–25 (D. Kan. 2017). 
 72 Id. at 1124. 
 73 Id. at 1125 (citing S. Rep. No. 100–64, at 17 (1987)). 
 74 Office of Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, supra note 
28, at *29. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Fed-
eral Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61468 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 34 
C.F.R. 106). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61468. 
 79 Id. (citing Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 646 (1999); Samuelson v. Or. 
State Univ., 725 Fed. App’x. 598, 599 (9th Cir. 2018); Farmer v. Kan. State Univ., No. 16-CV-2256-
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who know of incidents occurring at fraternities housed off-campus or 
during athletic travel away from the school may still need to report such 
conduct, since universities often exercise oversight over these activi-
ties.80 
3. Identity and authority of the coach 
Although many coaches’ contracts designate them as mandatory 
reporters, Title IX jurisprudence and executive interpretations may im-
pose independent reporting obligations on them. For example, in 
Gebser, the Supreme Court explained that schools have actual notice of 
sexual misconduct (and thus, incur Title IX liability) when an “appro-
priate person” knows of the misconduct and fails to report it.81 An “ap-
propriate person” is “an official who, at minimum, has authority to ad-
dress the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on 
the recipient’s behalf.”82 Many courts conclude that determining who 
has such authority is “‘necessarily a fact-based inquiry’ because of the 
varying roles of educational officials.”83 However, Gebser involved sex-
ual harassment by a school employee; in Davis, the Supreme Court 
made no mention of an “appropriate person” requirement in cases of 
peer-on-peer sexual harassment.84 One legal scholar thus concluded 
that “when the offending party is a student, virtually any employee can 
be presumed to have authority to take some corrective action.”85 In fact, 
only the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have ever applied the “appropri-
ate person” test to situations where a student (rather than an employee) 
committed the alleged sexual misconduct.86 
 Despite the language in Davis, OCR previously required that only 
“responsible employees” be mandatory reporters of peer-on-peer sexual 
misconduct.87 Federal regulations mandated schools to designate at 
least one person as such an employee.88 Different from an appropriate 
 
JAR-GEB, 2017 WL 980460, at *8 (D. Kan. Mar. 14, 2017)). 
 80 Id. (citing Farmer, 2017 WL 9804060, at *8). 
 81 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Kinsman v. Florida State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, No. 4:15cv235-MW/CAS, 2015 WL 
11110848, at *2 (N.D. Fla., Aug. 12, 2015) (quoting Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 604 F.3d 
1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010)). 
 84 See Brian Bardwell, No One Is an Inappropriate Person: The Mistaken Application of 
Gebser’s Appropriate Person Test to Title IX Peer-Harassment Cases, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1343, 
1349 (2018). 
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 86 Id. at 1349, 1354. 
 87 Office of Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 26, at *14. 
 88 34 C.F.R. § 106.8 (1980). 
626 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019 
person, a responsible employee is “anyone who has the authority to re-
dress sexual violence; who has been given the duty of reporting inci-
dents of sexual violence or any other misconduct by students to their 
Title IX coordinator or other appropriate school designee; or whom a 
student could reasonably believe has this authority or duty.”89 In prac-
tice, however, this standard seemed to sweep just as broadly as the “ap-
propriate person” analysis in Davis—one study examined the reporting 
policies of 150 universities and discovered that 69% of them designated 
all of their employees as “responsible employees.”90 
Unable to reconcile the “responsible employee” and “appropriate 
person” standards, courts divide as to whether coaches incur Title IX 
reporting obligations. For example, one court decided that an assistant 
coach who failed to report the rape of a student equipment manager did 
not possess sufficient authority to qualify as an “appropriate person.”91 
However, the court determined that the school’s athletic director was 
such a person, but left open whether the head coach would be as well.92 
On the other hand, coaches of highly successful programs are almost 
certain to incur reporting responsibilities. The Tenth Circuit, for exam-
ple, emphasized that the head coach of the University of Colorado foot-
ball team enjoyed such prestige, influence, and authority that his posi-
tion within the school “was comparable to that of police chief in a 
municipal government.”93 Thus, his failure to report and address ongo-
ing sexual violence committed by recruits of the football team was evi-
dence of the entire school’s failure to comply with Title IX.94 
The DOE’s proposed guidelines attempt to clarify the responsibili-
ties of university employees by retiring the “responsible person” termi-
nology.95 Instead, schools must designate a “coordinator,” who is re-
quired to inform victims of their right to file a formal sexual misconduct 
complaint (which triggers the school’s grievance procedures and can be 
done at any time), to handle and process such reports, and to offer sup-
portive measures (i.e., counseling or housing changes).96 In the absence 
 
 89 Office of Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 26, at *15. 
 90 See Merle H. Weiner, A Principled and Legal Approach to Title IX Reporting, 85 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 71, 77–78 (2017) (arguing that such “wide-net” reporting policies actually deter victims from 
coming forward). 
 91 See S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724, 738 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1184 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 94 Id. at 1184–85. 
 95 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Fed-
eral Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61481 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 34 
C.F.R. 106). 
 96 Id. 
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of a formal complaint, however, the coordinator does not incur an inde-
pendent obligation to report sexual misconduct.97 
Yet the new DOE regulations still adopt the “appropriate person” 
test from Gebser for the purposes of determining whether a school had 
actual knowledge of sexual misconduct.98 They also suggest that this 
analysis applies regardless of whether the sexual misconduct is perpe-
trated by a school employee or by a peer.99 Under this approach, coaches 
who have both notice of actionable harassment, as well as the authority 
to institute corrective measures on the school’s behalf, incur an obliga-
tion to report the misconduct. Additionally, although the proposed reg-
ulations agree that determining whether an employee possesses such 
authority is a “fact-specific inquiry,” they also state that “the mere abil-
ity or obligation to report sexual harassment” (for example, in an em-
ployment contract) is not per se evidence of such authority.100 This lan-
guage leaves open the possibility that, even when a coach’s contract 
designates him or her as a mandatory reporter, there are situations 
where he or she may not trigger the school’s Title IX liability for failing 
to report an incident. 
4. Identity of the victim and perpetrator 
The DOE’s webpage for Title IX Frequently Asked Questions states 
that Title IX protects, not only students, but “all persons from discrim-
ination, including parents and guardians, students, and employees.”101 
Nonetheless, the identity of the victim and the perpetrator, as well as 
the source of a complaint, do seem to matter to a Title IX action. Victims 
may include, for example, employees of the school,102 although courts 
are divided as to whether those employees must first exhaust their rem-
edies under Title VII.103 
 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 61466–68. 
 99 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61466–68. 
 100 Id. at 61467. (citing Plamp v. Mitchell Sch. Dist. No. 17–2, 565 F.3d 450, 459 (8th Cir. 2009), 
Santiago v. P.R., 655 F.3d 61, 75 (1st Cir. 2011)) (emphasis added). 
 101 Sex Discrimination Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS (Sept. 25, 2018) (emphasis added), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ ocr/frontpage/faq 
/sex.html#sexdisc4 [https://perma.cc/YMW9-C8CL]. 
 102 See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). 
 103 Compare Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 754 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that permitting em-
ployment claims under Title IX without first exhausting Title VII remedies disrupts federal em-
ployment law) with Burton v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 171 F. Supp. 
3d 830, 840 (W.D. Wis. 2016), reconsideration denied, No. 14-CV-274-JDP, 2016 WL 3512287, at 
*1 (W.D. Wis. June 22, 2016) (differentiating Lakoski as limited to employment discrimination, 
and refusing to extend it to retaliation claims, which do not require Title VII exhaustion). 
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On the other hand, courts are split as to whether Title IX liability 
attaches when the victim has no affiliation with the recipient univer-
sity. For instance, in Simpson, the Tenth Circuit explained that, even 
though one of the victims was not a student (and therefore, not pro-
tected by Title IX), “that circumstance [was] irrelevant to evaluation of 
risk to [other University of Colorado] women.”104 But a recent First Cir-
cuit case held that a Providence University student who was assaulted 
by a student at Brown University could not bring a Title IX suit against 
Brown.105 The First Circuit explained that, in order to prove discrimi-
nation, the victim “must be a participant, or at least have the intent to 
participate, in the defendant’s educational program or activity.”106 
These decisions make it ambiguous whether a coach must report, for 
example, a player who sexually assaults a student from another school. 
The source of an allegation also seems to matter to a mandatory 
reporting analysis under Title IX. For example, the 2001 OCR Guide-
lines required a report and investigation when a student’s parent re-
ported an incident of sexual misconduct against his or her child.107 How-
ever, they explained that when employees learn about misconduct 
“through other means . . . [like] a witness to an incident or an anony-
mous letter or telephone call,” their required response will vary based 
on several different factors.108 Among these are: (1) “the source and na-
ture of the information;” (2) “the seriousness of the alleged incident;” (3) 
“the specificity of the information;” (4) “the objectivity and credibility of 
the source of the report;” and (5) whether the individuals “who were 
subjected to the alleged harassment” can be identified and “want to pur-
sue the matter.”109 
The proposed Title IX regulations, however, simplify matters and 
do not address the source of an allegation; instead, they only require 
schools to instigate grievance procedures when a formal complaint is 
filed or when a university receives multiple complaints about the same 
individual.110 Thus, the identity and affiliation of the alleged perpetra-
tor may also matter in a Title IX analysis to the extent that the institu-
tion has control over the assailant. In fact, the Supreme Court stated in 
 
 104 Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007). See also Kinsman 
v. Fla. State Univ. Bd. of Tr., No. 4:15cv235-MW/CAS, 2015 WL 11110848, at *3 (N.D. Fla., Aug. 
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the victim was and the connection with the funding recipient”). 
 105 See generally Doe v. Brown Univ., 896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018).  
 106 Id. at 131. 
 107 See Office for Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 26, at *18. 
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 109 See id. 
 110 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Fed-
eral Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61469 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 34 
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Davis that “the regulatory scheme surrounding Title IX” informs 
schools that “they may be liable for their failure to respond to discrimi-
natory acts of certain nonagents.”111 There are, of course, limitations to 
this statement. Title IX liability for damages is limited to “circum-
stances wherein the recipient exercises substantial control over both 
the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs.”112 
Thus, social-media harassment by third parties against a victim who 
accused the quarterback on her university’s football team of sexual as-
sault is not actionable, “but can bear on the severity and offensiveness” 
that the victim suffers.113 
B. Clery Act Reporting Obligations 
Unlike Title IX, the Clery Act explicitly imposes reporting obliga-
tions on the universities to which it applies.114 Specifically, it requires 
schools to disclose their campus security policy and statistics of certain 
crimes occurring in a defined geographical area.115 Additionally, “alt-
hough the Clery Act generally does not require particular policies or 
procedures, a more detailed policy statement is necessary with regard 
to campus sexual assaults.”116 Thus, schools (and by extension, coaches) 
may face stricter Clery Act obligations for sex-based crimes than for 
other crimes covered by the act, such as robbery. 
1. Private v. public enforcement actions 
No private right-of-action is available under the Clery Act.117 The 
text of the statute provides that it cannot “be construed to . . . [either] 
create a cause of action” against a university or its employees or to “es-
tablish any standard of care.”118 Courts have honored this provision, 
barring plaintiffs from asserting any sort of liability for a school’s fail-
ure to honor its Clery Act duties.119 However, the DOE permits parties 
to trigger a noncompliance investigation by filing a complaint with its 
 
 111 Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999). 
 112 Id. at 645. 
 113 Kinsman v. Fla. State Univ. Bd. of Tr., No. 4:15cv235-MW/CAS, 2015 WL 11110848, at *5 
(N.D. Fla., Aug. 12, 2015). 
 114 See 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (2013). 
 115 Id. at § 1092(f). 
 116 Heacox, supra note 1, at 53. 
 117 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(14)(A). 
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 119 See, e.g., Moore v. Murray St. Univ., No. 5:12-CV-00178, 2013 WL 960320, at *3 (W.D. Ky. 
2013). See also Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25, 31–32 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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office.120 The DOE may also initiate investigations in the following cir-
cumstances: (1) after a school conducts an independent audit for com-
pliance, (2) via a review selection process, and (3) “if media attention 
raises concerns.”121 
DOE Clery Act investigations are extensive and may include: re-
views of university publications, policies, and procedures; sampling of 
crime reports filed and logged on campus; interviews; and attendance 
at university meetings.122 A university who fails to meet its obligations 
faces fines of up to $27,500 per violation.123 For example, after Jerry 
Sandusky (an assistant football coach at Penn State) was arrested for 
ongoing sexual abuse of young boys attending football camps, the De-
partment imposed a fine of over $2 million on the university for Clery 
Act violations.124 It noted the failure of the athletic staff, particularly 
the head coach Joe Paterno, to report allegations of sexual violence to 
the campus police.125 Its findings relied heavily on the investigative pro-
cedures, which revealed numerous violations under 34 C.F.R. § 668 (the 
regulations setting forth the specific requirements and procedures 
schools must implement to report crime, i.e., keeping records for at least 
three years).126 
The Penn State case indicates some of the troubling procedural 
characteristics of the Clery Act’s mandatory reporting policies. In par-
ticular, the Act shields the coaches from personal liability for its viola-
tions, as plaintiffs do not have a private right-of-action and the DOE ‘s 
only remedy is to fine an institution for its failures.127 Moreover, the Act 
does not permit private plaintiffs to seek monetary damages—as dis-
cussed later in the Comment, this feature tends to lead the DOE to focus 
its attention on large-scale violations. Still, the Clery Act “fine” letters 
issued by the DOE after an investigation do provide coaches and uni-
versities with an exact discussion about where reporting failures oc-
curred and how to prevent such mishaps in the future.128 
 
 120 Heacox, supra note 1, at *55. 
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2. Substance and definitions of reporting obligations (“what and 
where?”) 
In comparison to Title IX, the Clery Act provides much more spe-
cific definitions for the crimes that it requires coaches to report, often 
cross-referencing other federal law. For example, it explains that sexual 
assault is a “forcible or nonforcible sex offense,” as classified by the 
FBI’s uniform crime reporting system.129 This includes “penetration, no 
matter how slight of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or 
oral penetration . . . without the consent of the victim,” as well as at-
tempted penetration.130 The Clery Act also requires reports for domestic 
violence, dating violence, and stalking, which are defined in section 
12291(a) of Title 34.131 This section, known as the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA),132 defines domestic violence as “felony or misde-
meanor crimes of violence committed by [among other things] a current 
or former spouse or intimate partner of the victim.”133 Similarly, dating 
violence is “violence committed by a person who is or has been in a social 
relationship of romantic or intimate nature with the victim.”134 Finally, 
stalking means “engaging in a course of conduct directed at a specific 
person that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety 
or suffer substantial emotional distress.”135 
Furthermore, unlike Title IX, the Clery Act has specific geograph-
ical constraints on reporting. Initially, the Act required universities to 
report violent crimes occurring: (1) on campus; (2) off-campus in build-
ings “owned or controlled” by the institution; and (3) on public property 
within the area “reasonably contiguous to the institution and adjacent 
to a facility owned or controlled by the institution.”136 However, Con-
gress expanded the law to include crimes committed on “non-campus” 
property “adjacent to a facility owned and controlled by the institution,” 
so long as such property is used by the institution in some way to fur-
ther its academic goals.137 
 
 129 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(6)(A)(v). 
 130 Federal Bureau of Investigation, UCR Offense Definitions, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. (Jan. 26, 
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 133 Id. at § 12291(a)(8). 
 134 Id. at § 12291(a)(10). 
 135 Id. at § 12291(a)(30). 
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§ 1092(f)(6)(A)(i)-(iii)). 
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Helpfully, the DOE provides a Handbook with examples to help 
schools understand the practical meaning of these definitions and 
boundaries.138 For example, it explains that hospitals and medical as-
sociations count as institution property for the purposes of the act, as 
do off-campus buildings that students “consider to be, and treat as” part 
of the campus, such as art studios.139 It also provides detailed scenarios 
to illustrate the scope of reportable sexual violence, including dating 
violence, domestic violence, and stalking.140 For example, a heated ar-
gument between a husband and wife on campus is not considered do-
mestic violence if neither party reports physical harm or intimida-
tion.141 
3. Identity and authority of the coach 
The Clery Act requires university actors to report sexual violence 
when they are acting as “campus security authorities” (CSAs).142 The 
DOE’s Handbook on reporting explains that a CSA is “an official who 
has significant responsibility for student and campus activities.”143 It 
includes in its examples of CSAs “director[s] of athletics, [and] all ath-
letic coaches (including part-time employees and graduate assis-
tants).”144 However, reporting is only mandatory when the coach re-
ceives the allegation in his or her “capacity as a CSA.”145 This means 
that coaches do not have the obligation to report incidents that they 
overhear or learn about indirectly. 
During the Penn State Sandusky investigation (discussed in Sec-
tion II(B)(1)), the DOE used these definitions to determine whether 
CSAs at the school failed to report the violence.146 The investigation em-
phasized the failure of both Penn State’s head football coach (Joe Pat-
erno) and a graduate assistant (Mike McQueary) to report McQueary’s 
eyewitness account of Sandusky sexual assaulting a child in the locker 
room to anyone beyond the athletic director.147 According to the DOE, 
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ty and Security Reporting 2016 Edition, DEPT. OF EDUC. (June 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/ 
lead/safety/handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4XM-3F8G] [hereinafter The Handbook for Campus 
Safety]. 
 139 Id. at ch. 2, 3–4. 
 140 Id. at ch. 3. 
 141 Id. at ch. 3, 37–38. 
 142 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(iii). 
 143 The Handbook for Campus Safety, supra note 137, at ch. 4, 2–3. 
 144 Id. at ch. 3. 
 145 Id. at ch. 4, 5. 
 146 See Penn State Campus Crime Final Program Review Determination, supra note 125, at 
*24. 
 147 Id. 
615] WHISTLE BLOWERS 633 
both McQueary and Paterno were mandatory reporters under the Clery 
Act, and thus they should have reported the incident to Penn State Uni-
versity Police Department to include in its annual crime statistics.148 
This was true even though Penn State itself did not designate 
McQueary as a Clery Act reporter and only conceded that Paterno was 
a reporter after conducting an internal investigation.149 
4. Identity of the victim and perpetrator 
The text of the Clery Act itself does not specify whether it applies 
only to victims and perpetrators who are associated with the university. 
However, the Campus Crime Reporting Handbook issued by the DOE 
states that, for reporting purposes, it does not matter “whether or not 
the individuals involved in the crime, or reporting the crime, are asso-
ciated with the institution.”150 Thus, a coach does not need to know 
much about the victim or perpetrator’s identity—only that the coach 
learned of the crime while in his or her official capacity as a CSA.151 
The official capacity requirement is the greatest limitation on the 
Clery Act in this sense. Coaches do not need to report, for example, as-
saults and violence that students mention in settings like “Take Back 
the Night”152 events.153 They also do not need to report overheard con-
versations or other indirect ways of learning about an incident.154 How-
ever, if the coach has no reason to believe that a direct allegation was 
not made in good-faith, he or she must report it, even if it came from a 
third party.155 For example, a coach must report a sexual assault that 
he or she learns about through a local mental health counselor who calls 
to inform the coach that a student on campus sought treatment for the 
assault.156 
The Clery Act Handbook makes it much more straightforward for 
collegiate coaches to understand their reporting obligations. However, 
because it is merely a handbook, it is not “law.” Furthermore, the Clery 
Act’s purpose is to require institutions to keep accurate statistical crime 
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data; therefore, it only requires university employees to report allega-
tions “to the official or office designated by the institution to collect 
crime report information.”157 These reports do not need to include the 
names or information of the alleged victim or perpetrator and do not 
require further action on the part of the coach.158 
III. PROPOSAL TO CLARIFY AND HARMONIZE COACHES’ REPORTING 
OBLIGATIONS 
Although sexual misconduct in collegiate athletics is by no means 
a new problem, the #MeToo Movement highlights the prevalence of sex-
ual violence on college campuses.159 Unfortunately, ambiguities in fed-
eral reporting laws and executive regulations result in a body of incon-
sistent jurisprudence. Unable to untangle these inconsistencies, 
universities often attempt to solve the problem and avoid liability by 
inserting all-encompassing reporting clauses into their employment 
contracts, requiring coaches to report all instances of “sexual miscon-
duct.”160 Coaches are left to their own devices to understand their re-
porting obligations under such broad and vague terms. This leads to 
both under-reporting (and increased sexual violence on campus)161 and 
over-reporting (and inadequate protection for both victims and alleged 
assailants).162 Clarifying the scope of coaches’ reporting obligations un-
der federal law is thus critical and overdue in order to ensure the ap-
propriate balance of safety and confidentiality for victims, as well as 
due process for the accused. 
As the law currently stands, both Title IX and the Clery Act fall 
short of achieving a consistent standard. Title IX itself is broad, neces-
sitating executive guidance and regulations, as well as adjudication, to 
guide its interpretation. The Clery Act, on the other hand, contains 
more specific and extensive reporting regulations within its statute and 
regulatory scheme. However, its failure to provide for a private right-
of-action directs DOE resources towards large-scale violations (like the 
Penn State scandal), leaving inadequate remedies for individual plain-
tiffs. Therefore, to maximize the efficacy of federal reporting law, the 
proper solution is to enact Title IX regulations that mimic the substance 
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of the Clery Act and its Handbook. Such a solution would preserve the 
procedure and structure of Title IX proceedings (including the private 
right-of-action) and also minimize inconsistency in judicial enforcement 
of Title IX, since courts would likely defer to DOE interpretations under 
Chevron.163 
A. Proposed Substance of Reporting Obligations 
To harmonize the requirements of these two statutes governing 
federal reporting obligations, the regulations and jurisprudence guiding 
Title IX enforcement should mirror the substance of the Clery Act (with 
a few exceptions). Specifically, Title IX interpretations should include 
Clery Act sex-based crimes (such as sexual assault, dating violence, and 
stalking) in their definition of actionable discrimination. They should 
also clarify the boundaries of the Davis sexual harassment standard 
and the “appropriate person” test by mimicking the Clery Act Hand-
book. However, Title IX should continue to take its own approach to 
defining (1) the geographical scope of reporting obligations and (2) 
which allegations require a report. This approach respects the differing 
goals of the two statutes while also availing Title IX of the Clery Act’s 
specificity and clarity. 
1. Title IX interpretations should mimic the Clery Act’s substan-
tive definitions of sex-based crimes. 
The Trump Administration’s proposed regulations define sexual 
harassment as (1) conduct that satisfies the Davis standard (“severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive” behavior), or (2) conduct that sat-
isfies the standard for quid pro quo sexual harassment and assault, as 
defined by the Clery Act.164 However, this definition fails to include 
other sex-based Clery Act crimes—such as dating violence and stalk-
ing—and also does nothing to clarify the Davis standard. These defi-
ciencies result in an incomplete understanding of sex-based discrimina-
tion, and require coaches to disentangle two different definitions of 
sexual misconduct in order to determine whether the Clery Act or Title 
IX requires a report. 
To remedy the problem, the Title IX regulations should adopt a def-
inition of actionable sexual misconduct that incorporates not just sexual 
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 164 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61466 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified 
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assault, but also the other VAWA crimes listed in the Clery Act (domes-
tic violence, dating violence, and stalking). The DOE explains the omis-
sion of these crimes in its proposed regulations by pointing out that Ti-
tle IX is a contract that requires federally funded universities to comply 
with anti-discrimination law on the basis of sex—not to prevent all 
crimes related to sex.165 However, this interpretation misunderstands 
Title IX’s text and purpose. Title IX prevents federal funding recipients 
from discriminating “on the basis of sex” in order to promote equal ed-
ucational opportunities for university members.166 Consistent with this 
language, it follows that if sexual harassment and sexual assault can 
constitute actionable discrimination, other sex-based crimes (like da-
ting violence) can have a similarly discriminatory effect, discussed in 
detail later in this section. Thus, the proposed Title IX regulations 
should expand their definition of actionable sexual misconduct to in-
clude domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking as defined by the 
Clery Act. Doing so would harmonize federal laws for reporting sex-
based crimes, minimizing confusion and promoting compliance. Until 
such amendments are made, however, courts should interpret the Davis 
“severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” standard of sexual harass-
ment to presumptively include conduct that meets the Clery Act defini-
tion of dating violence, domestic violence, or stalking. 
The Davis standard also requires some clarification, given its in-
consistent application by courts. Although it is likely impossible for the 
DOE to articulate exactly what behavior is “severe, pervasive, and ob-
jectively offensive” without being over or under inclusive,167 the sug-
gested Title IX regulations could benefit from including a few examples 
of the boundaries of the definition. The best way to do so would be to 
model the Clery Handbook, providing examples of behavior that must 
and must not be reported within the federal regulations. For instance, 
the regulations could clarify whether “severe, pervasive, and objectively 
offensive” behavior can ever include a single incident of harassment168 
and whether the conduct present in Pahssen (three separate incidents 
of harassment, including pushing a student against a locker, demand-
ing oral sex, and making obscene gestures) would ever be actionable.169 
Setting such limits would not only clarify the scope of coaches’ reporting 
obligations, but also help universities draft future sexual misconduct 
 
 165 Id. at 61467–68. 
 166 See Lanser, supra note 15, at 184. 
 167 Although, helpfully, the Davis court suggests a number of factors that will weigh on this 
consideration, including the ages of the harasser and the victim, as well as the number of individ-
uals involved (see Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999) (citing Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)). 
 168 A question raised in Davis; see Davis, 526 U.S. at 653. 
 169 See Pahssen v. Merrill Cmty. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 360, 363–64 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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clauses in employment contracts. Because schools would be more aware 
of the limits to their own Title IX obligations, they would have a better 
sense of how to define any additional reporting obligations that they 
wish to impose on their staff. Thus, coaches would face fewer all-inclu-
sive “sexual misconduct” clauses, and have a clearer idea of what be-
havior they need to report. 
A potential objection to this expanded Title IX definition might be 
that it is overly broad, given that domestic violence, dating violence, 
and stalking do not necessarily have to be motivated by the victim’s sex 
(and thus are not per se discriminatory). This certainly seems to be one 
of the DOE’s concerns in excluding such crimes.170 However, this argu-
ment overlooks both the statistics behind these crimes, as well as the 
potential solutions to limit concerns about Title IX capturing crimes 
that are not “on the basis of sex.” 
First, like sexual assault—which is included in the DOE’s defini-
tion of actionable misconduct—dating violence, domestic violence, and 
stalking are empirically sex-based.171 Second, the proposed regulations 
(or judicial interpretations of them) could remedy the problem by creat-
ing a “rebuttable presumption” that these crimes are sex-based. Thus, 
schools would be allowed to demonstrate that a certain instance of do-
mestic violence, sexual assault, dating violence, or stalking was not in 
fact based on the victim’s sex. 
There may also be concerns that this approach will constrain the 
flexibility of the Davis standard, rendering it unable to respond to var-
ying fact patterns and new forms of sexual harassment (i.e., cyberbul-
lying). Again, this fear is groundless. Providing general limitations as 
to whether behavior is “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” 
does not preclude courts from exercising discretion and evaluating 
where specific conduct should fall along the spectrum. Rather, bounda-
ries can serve to harmonize federal law as to broad questions (like 
whether a single instance of misbehavior can meet the Davis standard), 
while leaving the majority of cases somewhere in the middle. Indeed, 
courts will still be able to conduct their own case-by-case analysis for 
 
 170 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61467–68 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codi-
fied at 34 C.F.R. 106). 
 171 See Jennifer James, We Are Not Done: A Federally Codified Evidentiary Standard Is Neces-
sary for College Sexual Assault, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 1321, 1331 (2016) (discussing the history of 
VAWA and explaining that it includes “domestic violence . . . dating violence, sexual assault, and 
stalking” because they involve higher rates of targeting victims due to their sex than other crimes); 
Shannon Cleary, Using Title IX and the Model of Public Housing to Prevent Housing Discrimina-
tion Against Survivors of Sexual Assaults on College Campuses, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 364, 
366 (2016) (explaining that sexual assault, particularly on college campuses, disproportionately 
affects women and that 19.3% of women have been raped during their lifetime, compared with 
1.7% of men). 
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actionable harassment using the factors that Davis suggests they con-
sider—the age of the harasser, the age of the victim, the number of in-
dividuals involved—as well as any other unique circumstances they 
find relevant to the situation at hand.172 This approach is optimal for 
coaches and universities; they will understand what conduct definitely 
is and is not actionable, and be allowed to tailor their contractual poli-
cies accordingly. 
2. Title IX’s “appropriate person” test requires clarification that 
parallels the “CSA” examples in the Clery Act Handbook. 
Perhaps the most ambiguous element of Title IX guidance and ju-
risprudence is the “appropriate person” test and its application to uni-
versity employees, like collegiate coaches. The proposed DOE regula-
tions recognize that categorically designating school employees (like 
coaches) as “reporters” or “non-reporters” is not optimal, given the var-
ying roles these individuals might play depending on the school.173 Nev-
ertheless, the regulations still lack any meaningful criteria or limita-
tions to guide universities, coaches, and courts in interpreting who has 
the responsibility to report sexual misconduct. Accordingly, Title IX 
guidance should provide concrete examples of the “appropriate person” 
test’s boundaries by following the Clery Act Handbook’s format for de-
termining the scope of CSA authority. Additionally, courts applying the 
“appropriate person” test should enumerate a series of factors to guide 
their analysis from case to case. 
The Clery Act Handbook employs a bright-line rule that says 
coaches always have the duty to report sexual violence when acting in 
their official capacity as a CSA.174 While this approach is straightfor-
ward, holding coaches to be per se appropriate persons under Title IX 
is inconsistent with Gebser, which rejected automatic vicarious liability 
for schools.175 On the other hand, the Clery Act Handbook provides ex-
amples of the limitations to a coach’s “official capacity” status. The pro-
posed Title IX regulations could implement a similar series of examples 
that explain, for instance, whether a graduate-student coach can ever 
be an appropriate person with respect to employee misconduct (presum-
ably, student coaches do not have the authority to institute corrective 
measures against their superiors and thus cannot be appropriate per-
sons under Gebser). Doing so would provide clearer boundaries for 
courts to assist their “case-by-case” analyses. Additionally, the judicial 
 
 172 Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 
(1998)). 
 173 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61467–68. 
 174 See The Handbook for Campus Safety, supra note 138, at ch. 4, 3. 
 175 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 288 (1998). 
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branch itself should enumerate a series of factors that weigh on the Ti-
tle IX appropriate person analysis for coaches. These factors could in-
clude the coach’s level of authority, employment status at the university 
(full-time or part-time), and the coach’s relationship with the victim 
and/or alleged assailant.176 
One might argue that the approaches discussed above do not pro-
vide coaches or universities with adequate notice ex ante about which 
employees constitute appropriate persons. This might appear particu-
larly concerning because courts sometimes refuse to defer to a school’s 
designation of whether the employee is such a person.177 This fear is 
overstated, however, when considered in conjunction with the DOE’s 
other proposed regulations. Specifically, the regulations now require a 
coach (or other appropriate person) to report misconduct when (1) the 
victim files a formal report directly or (2) the alleged offender is a repeat 
perpetrator.178 If courts interpret these provisions to also apply to pri-
vate lawsuits, a coach will only be a Title IX mandatory reporter in 
those two circumstances. Accordingly, universities will understand 
when crafting their employment contracts which employees (and 
coaches) are most often in these situations, and thus more likely to be 
appropriate persons in a judicial analysis. 
3. Title IX should maintain its distinct approach to the scope 
and source of reporting obligations. 
Although the Trump Administration’s proposed Title IX guidelines 
would generally benefit from harmonization with the substance of the 
Clery Act, they should continue to maintain a distinct approach to (1) 
the geographical scope of educational liability and (2) the source and 
origin of complaints requiring reports. In particular, Title IX should 
continue to employ a broader conception of geographical liability than 
the Clery Act, but require reports from a narrower set of circumstances. 
Doing so would promote the separate purposes of the two statutes by 
differentiating them in a way that is easy for coaches and universities 
to understand and apply. 
The Clery Act only requires coaches (in their role as CSAs) to report 
sexual misconduct on or near campus, but179 also mandates that they 
 
 176 Universities may already consider some of these factors when writing their reporting poli-
cies. For example, the University of Oregon designates “all coaches of any team on which the ac-
cused student is a member” as mandatory reporters, “but only the head coaches of any team on 
which the complainant is a member.” See Weiner, supra note 90, at 144–45 (emphasis added). 
 177 See, e.g., Kinsman v. Fla. State Univ. Bd. of Tr., No. 4:15cv235-MW/CAS, 2015 WL 
11110848, at *2 (N.D. Fla., Aug. 12, 2015) (refusing to defer to Florida State’s contention that it 
considered neither its head coach nor athletic director to be appropriate persons under Title IX). 
 178 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61469. 
 179 See The Handbook for Campus Safety, supra note 138, at ch. 2, 3–4. 
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report all good-faith allegations of such crimes.180 In contrast, the pro-
posed Title IX regulations do not have any geographical constraints 
(and, in this sense, are broader than the Clery Act), but they also only 
require universities to address formal complaints filed directly by vic-
tims affiliated with the school, as well as complaints that implicate a 
repeat offender.181 These differences are appropriate given the distinct 
purposes of the two laws, and, moreover, they are straightforward for 
universities, coaches and courts to apply. 
The Clery Act serves to provide transparent and accurate statisti-
cal data about crimes on college campuses in order to allow prospective 
students and university members to evaluate the school’s safety.182 It is 
therefore sensible for the reach of the statute to be limited in its geo-
graphical scope (the data would lose its meaning if it extended too far 
away from the university’s boundaries), but broad in its reporting 
sources (refusing to report a crime because it was filed by the victim’s 
parent, rather than the victim him or herself, would again impede sta-
tistical accuracy). On the other hand, Title IX exists to address sex-
based discrimination in federally funded universities.183 It follows that 
off-campus programs or activities controlled or funded by the university 
should trigger liability, but that these reports should come from those 
directly affected by the discrimination. 
Nevertheless, one might contend that imposing two sets of report-
ing duties based on the source of the complaint and the location of the 
incident creates undue confusion for coaches. However, the two sets of 
obligations are actually straightforward for coaches to follow, as well as 
for the DOE and courts to evaluate. Coaches who receive word of or are 
witness to sexual misconduct only need to answer two questions to de-
termine whether the Clery Act and/or Title IX requires them to file a 
report. The first is where the conduct took place and the second is who 
filed the allegation (including whether the complaint was filed directly 
by the victim or whether the complainant is affiliated with the school). 
If the conduct took place within the boundaries specified by the Clery 
Act, the coach will know to follow Clery Act procedures regardless of the 
source of the complaint. On the other hand, the coach need not evaluate 
whether a program is “university sponsored or affiliated” for Title IX 
reporting; he or she has the obligation only to address incidents filed 
directly by victims, or those which he or she knows implicates a repeat 
offender. This will relieve pressure for coaches to determine whether 
 
 180 Id. at ch. 4, 1. 
 181 Id. at 61469. 
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they must file a Title IX report, for example, in the case of an unsub-
stantiated incident they learned about indirectly or an incident unaffil-
iated with the university’s programs. 
Another counterargument to this approach might be that Title IX 
will deter reporting and lead to increased sexual violence by limiting 
coaches’ responsibilities to only those instances where the victim of sex-
ual misconduct files a formal report. However, this harm is mitigated 
in a few ways. Most importantly, the formal report only matters for trig-
gering grievance procedures against the accused; it does not relieve the 
university of its obligation under Title IX to provide supportive 
measures to the victim to allow her or him to continue to obtain equal 
benefits to education.184 Thus, universities have the incentive to con-
tractually require their coaches not to report all incidents, but rather to 
refer the victims to the school’s coordinator to make sure they receive 
support and learn of their right to file a complaint. Moreover, the coach 
must still file a report under his or her Clery Act obligations if the event 
occurred on or near campus buildings. 
Another potential problem with the divergent scopes of the two acts 
relates instead to Clery Act reporting; coaches may be uneasy about re-
porting sexual misconduct that they learn about indirectly from a 
source other than the victim him or herself. However, the Clery Act’s 
Handbook permits—indeed, requires—coaches to file Clery Act reports 
without giving the name of the victim or the accused.185 This allows the 
coach to file a report with less worry about implicating either party’s 
privacy interests and respects the decisions of victims who choose not 
to file a formal complaint. 
B. Proposed Procedure for Reporting Obligations 
Although some of the substantive reporting suggestions discussed 
above could theoretically be incorporated into either Title IX or the 
Clery Act, they belong under the structure and regime of Title IX, due 
to its private right-of-action. 
The Clery Act’s fatal flaw to ensuring sufficient compliance with its 
reporting laws is its procedural structure—it does not permit individual 
plaintiffs to bring a private lawsuit. Accordingly, and understandably, 
administrative enforcement agencies tend to direct resources towards 
remedying the most egregious violations of the Act, like the Penn State 
 
 184 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61469 (“[S]upport-
ive measures may include, among other things, ‘counseling, extension of deadlines . . . campus 
escort services . . . [and] changes in work or housing locations.’”). 
 185 The Handbook for Campus Safety, supra note 137, at ch. 4, 5. 
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scandal.186 Unfortunately, this tendency has the possible unintended 
consequence of overlooking smaller-scale violations, providing no indi-
vidual remedy when a coach fails to adhere to his or her reporting du-
ties. This becomes more problematic if the coach does not view him or 
herself as a campus security authority in settings outside the Clery 
Act’s scope, like during team travel, recruiting trips, or post-game cele-
brations. 
On the other hand, the proposed Title IX regulations purport to 
remedy the former procedural problems with Title IX enforcement, 
while avoiding the pitfalls of the Clery Act. Instead of taking the form 
of a guidance document or a DCL (with no legal effect), the DOE’s sug-
gested regulations follow an informal rulemaking procedure, complete 
with a public notice and comment period.187 The rationale for departing 
from the previous approaches taken by other administrations is to le-
gitimize the executive branch’s interpretation of Title IX—the new reg-
ulations are not meant to be mere suggestions.188 By developing and 
adopting informal regulations instead of publishing guidance letters, 
the hope is that schools will have a better understanding of the stand-
ard that they must adhere to in formulating reporting policies.189 In 
theory, universities will be less likely to ignore rules than guidelines 
and will thus follow a uniform standard in Title IX compliance, which 
provides more consistency and stability for collegiate coaches. 
Furthermore, while the DOE does not explicitly mention it, the new 
regulations may also have the effect of promoting uniform decisions 
across courts by availing themselves of judicial deference under Chev-
ron.190 Previous courts rarely deferred to or even referenced executive 
guidance documents and DCLs when interpreting Title IX; they often 
looked instead to Title IX’s text and purpose, as well as the original 
1975 federal regulations, even in cases of sexual harassment.191 In some 
 
 186 See, e.g., Penn State Fine Letter, supra note 122, at *1. (imposing a fine of almost $2.4 mil-
lion on Penn State for the university administration’s passivity towards the ongoing sexual abuse 
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circumstances, they also analogized Title IX to its “model” statute, Title 
VI.192 The courts’ failure to cite the previous administrations’ DCLs and 
guidelines is not conclusive proof that they did not defer at all to their 
formulations of Title IX. However, it does suggest that the rescinded 
guidance documents were not entitled to the “highest” deference that is 
generally afforded to executive interpretations of federal statutes under 
Chevron.193 Several Title IX cases unrelated to sexual misconduct sup-
port this theory. For example, many courts have held that Chevron ap-
plies to the original 1975 regulations on athletic and educational dis-
crimination.194 In contrast, the Supreme Court has held (in a FLSA 
case) that executive agency letters and guidelines are not entitled to 
Chevron deference,195 a holding which at least one court has extended 
to the former Title IX interpretations and DCLs.196 
Thus, by transitioning to informal regulations (rather than guid-
ance documents) as the primary means for executive interpretations of 
Title IX, the Trump Administration’s proposed rules should receive 
greater deference from future courts who are evaluating a university’s 
compliance with the statute. This minimizes the risk of inconsistent 
judgments for Title IX cases across circuits. Accordingly, private plain-
tiffs will have more reliable expectations for liability and be able to 
demonstrate a university’s noncompliance using this uniform standard. 
Coaches will also benefit from the increased transparency and predict-
ability of the standard, because it minimizes the guesswork that they 
must do to comply with the law. Thus, informal regulations under Title 
IX will ensure a better balance of the victim’s safety with the need for 
confidentiality and due process. 
There is a caveat, though. Recently, Justice Breyer took the posi-
tion in a dissent that deference to federal regulations is limited when 
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an executive agency implements an unexplained or poorly explained 
policy change.197 This echoes Justice Stevens’ dissent in Gebser and his 
concern that unduly high standards for institutional liability (such as 
requiring a school to have “actual knowledge” of harassment) would de-
prive plaintiffs of their statutory rights.198 If courts begin to accept this 
argument and believe that the proposed Title IX regulations represent 
a dramatic, politically motivated, or unexplained shift in policy, there 
is a possibility that the regulations would receive less deference. 
However, this outcome is unlikely; Justice Scalia’s majority re-
sponse to Justice Breyer largely dismisses the idea that “unexplained” 
policy shifts would receive less deference than other regulations.199 
Thus, coaches should expect that, should the proposed Title IX regula-
tions take effect, courts will grant them highest deference, which is the 
optimal outcome. Future administrations who disagree with the pro-
posed regulations may of course amend them, but will now need to give 
schools the benefit of a notice and comment period to allow them time 
to adapt their policies and to voice their opinion on any changes. Thus, 
even if the substantive executive guidelines for mandatory reporting 
change under Title IX, the process of implementing those guidelines will 
be more stable and slower to change, allowing coaches and universities 
time to get up to speed. There will also be a more consistent body of law 
for schools to rely upon when crafting sexual misconduct policies. 
Courts interpreting the proposed DOE regulations should therefore feel 
at ease adopting Justice Scalia’s position and deferring to the execu-
tive’s interpretation of Title IX. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Sexual violence on college campuses and in collegiate athletics is 
not a new phenomenon, but the #MeToo Movement helped reveal the 
extent of the problem and the existence of reporting failures prevalent 
under the current federal laws, particularly Title IX and the Clery Act. 
To remedy the problem and to strike the appropriate balance of confi-
dentiality, safety, and due process, the optimal solution is to amend the 
interpretation of Title IX (in both executive regulations and judicial 
opinions) to closely parallel the substance of the Clery Act. Doing so 
would create a consistent standard of liability for universities, allowing 
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them to understand and predict the types of sexual misconduct for 
which they may face liability. Title IX’s procedural structure would also 
permit recovery for wronged parties, regardless of whether the univer-
sity’s noncompliance is large enough to trigger a DOE investigation or 
confined to a single lawsuit. 
Accordingly, colleges will be able to write more precise reporting 
policies for their coaches. The universities will benefit from this by be-
ing better able to evaluate whether a coach is failing to comply with his 
or her duties (thus exposing the school to liability). Coaches, in turn, 
will benefit by understanding their specific responsibilities ex ante and 
not needing to guess what is expected of them. Most importantly, the 
substantive changes and the potential for judicial deference will lead to 
more consistent recovery across courts for survivors in private rights-
of-action. With the potential for increased financial liability for noncom-
pliance, schools will have the incentive to hold their coaches accounta-
ble and to craft policies that encourage them to comply with reporting 
obligations. 
